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1. Introduction 
Diagnoses of the seriousness of stagnation and the appropriate recovery process are 
important because they enable a government to evaluate its policy effects and 
implement additional policy if required. Several measures for diagnoses exist. A 
standard measure is the reduction in GDP (or its growth). Other measures are proposed 
by Chow and Kwan (1996) and Kwan and Chow (1996), who measured the effects of 
political movements in China (the Great Leap Forward Movement of 1958–1962 and 
the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1969) on output, consumption, and investment. They 
compared the ‘hypothetical’ time paths of these variables (i.e., the time paths in the 
absence of the political movements) with the actual time paths and computed the ratio 
between both time paths. This provided a measure of stagnation relating to the political 
movements. A third measure for diagnosis was developed by Lucas (1987) and Obstfeld 
(1994).  
 Lucas and Obstfeld measured compensations that would leave consumers 
indifferent to a decline in economic growth and an increase in economic instability. We 
refer to both types of compensation (for the decline in economic growth and the 
increase in instability) as the ‘welfare cost of stagnation’ and the model as the 
‘Lucas–Obstfeld model’. The welfare costs based on utility will equal the costs that 
people are willing to pay to prevent the outbreak of stagnation. Then, we can evaluate 
whether the cost of the policy to prevent stagnation, which a government would finance 
from tax revenues, is higher than the welfare cost of stagnation. The practical use of 
measuring this cost had not been explored previously. However, Lucas and Obstfeld did 
not define the cost of stagnation. Rather, their concern was with the latter compensation 
(the cost of the economic instability) and they did not provide any analysis of the cost of 
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stagnation: they only derived the formulation for the cost of stagnation. This also 
applies to work by Dolmars (1998), Krusell and Smith (1999), Storestetten et al. (2001), 
Beaudry and Pages (2001), and Pallage and Robe (2003). 
 We consider that an alternative to the Lucas–Obstfeld model is needed to 
measure the cost of stagnation. Lucas and Obstfeld assumed that: (i) a stagnation 
economy is characterized by constant growth over time and instability, (ii) an agent 
knows the moments of the distribution for the economy (i.e., they assume rational 
expectations), and (iii) an agent measures the cost from the beginning of stagnation to 
the future as the ‘whole cost’ of stagnation compared with a hypothetical economy (i.e., 
an economy without stagnation). Alternatively, we argue that it is natural to assume that: 
(i) the stagnation economy has more complex processes of time-varying growth and 
instability, (ii) an agent knows the moments of the distribution for today’s economy only 
and he/she expects (or believes) these moments will continue forever (i.e., myopic 
rational expectations, meaning that an agent bases tomorrow’s moments on tomorrow’s 
coming information, and the same for future moments), and (iii) an agent measures the 
cost of stagnation from period t to the future as a ‘ cost at period t’ compared with a 
hypothetical economy. Both cost measures are based on different setups. The alternative 
model can reflect decreasing costs period by period in the recovery process of 
stagnation. Other alternatives combining the above three aspects (i)–(iii) seem 
implausible and are difficult to derive by applying the previous contributions of Lucas 
(1987), Obstfeld (1994), and Kwan and Chow (1996).  
 The purpose of this paper is to propose an alternative measure to the 
Lucas–Obstfeld model for analyzing the welfare cost of stagnation, and to provide a 
practical illustration of the alternative model compared with the Lucas–Obstfeld model 
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by using Japanese data from 1975 to 2002.  
 By using this alternative model, we can evaluate: (i) whether the policy was 
implemented in a timely fashion, (ii) whether the policy cost was expensive compared 
with the cost of stagnation, and (iii) whether the policy was effective or whether 
additional policy is required. These specific exercises cannot be carried out under the 
existing frameworks, including the Lucas–Obstfeld model. However, how should we 
compare the Lucas–Obstfeld model and the alternative model? The ‘whole cost’ of 
stagnation by the Lucas–Obstfeld model is evaluated as being 25,390 yen per month 
(the cost ratio is 26% of the monthly consumption of 99,373 yen in January 1990, the 
starting period of stagnation). On the other hand, the alternative model evaluates the 
cost as being 35,798 yen per month (35%) in January 1992, and determines that the cost 
reaches a peak of 59,400 yen per month (51%) in December 2001, and falls to 55,610 
yen per month (48%) in the most recent period, August 2002. The cost does not show 
any clear sign of a decrease.  
 This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we sketch the Lucas–Obstfeld 
model, adding the analyses for the properties of the welfare costs. In Section 3, we 
provide an alternative model. In Section 4, we show the practical use of both models. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The Lucas–Obstfeld Model 
2.1. Framework 
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We sketch the Lucas–Obstfeld model.1 Following Lucas (1987), the representative 
agent lives infinitely and maximizes an expected utility function V by choosing real 
consumption Ct at time t. The agent has preferences specified by: 
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where β∈(0,1) is a constant discount factor and γ>0 is the constant coefficient of 
relative risk aversion. Here, we consider a pure exchange economy with no production, 
no storable goods, and no borrowing. Then, the optimal consumption Ct for an agent is 
subject to exogenous income It in each period and hence is equal to income: Ct = It for 
all t.  
 Lucas and Obstfeld assumed a class of exogenous income. Hence, the optimal 
consumption streams Ct with trend and cycle components, are given by: 
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where µ is the growth rate of consumption and ln zt ~ N(0, σ2). In addition, Lucas and 
                                                 
1 The Lucas–Obstfeld model was not constructed for practical use. Thus, it must be revised 
slightly, and so the cost that we derive is a little different from the original cost derived by Lucas 
and Obstfeld.  
.   
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Obstfeld assume that an agent has rational expectations, which implies that an agent 
knows those moments of the consumption distribution, and then maximizes an 
unconditional expectation of utility (1): the subscript of time t is not attached on V in (1). 
Owing to the property of the log-normal distribution, E(zt•exp(–σ2/2)) = 1, the mean 
consumption is: 
 
 ,)(1)( ttCE µλ +=  (3) 
 
where the mean consumption at t = 0 is λ.  
 Thus, Lucas and Obstfeld assumed that the stagnation process of exogenous 
income (consumption) can be expressed by constant moments over time of the 
distribution of consumption, λ, µ, and σ2, and that an agent has rational expectations.  
 Under the above setup, we can calculate the indirect utility given the 
consumption process described by (2) and denote it by V(λ, µ, σ2|γ,β). This is derived as 
follows: 
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Details of the derivation are given in the Appendix.  
 We consider two economies. One is called the stagnation economy, in which 
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consumption growth µ s and its variance σs2 are calculated based on the data in the 
stagnation period. We denote the resulting indirect utility as ),|,,V( 2SS βγσµλ S . The 
other economy is called the hypothetical economy (i.e., the economy without stagnation), 
which is based on expected consumption under the assumption that the growth rate and 
the variance in the prestagnation period are maintained during the stagnation period. 
The resulting indirect utility is ),|,,V( 2HH βγσµλ H . The intuition behind this 
comparison is shown in Figure 1. Owing to (3), the λH is mean consumption at the 
beginning of the stagnation period for the hypothetical economy. Thus, we compare 
both economies from the beginning of the stagnation period (denoted by t = 0 in Figure 
1). Although γ and β may differ between the prestagnation and stagnation periods, we 
assume that they remain constant over time at ),( βγ . 
 
[INSERT Figure 1] 
 
 Using the indirect utilities under these economies, we define the ‘whole cost’ of 
stagnation as follows. 
 
Definition 1. The cost of stagnation is given by λ*, which satisfies the following 
equation: 
 
 ),|,,(),| ,*,( 2H
2
S βγσµλβγσµλλ HHSS VV =+ , (5) 
 
where the subscripts S and H denote the stagnation economy and the hypothetical 
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economy, respectively. 
 The key concept relating to the whole cost of stagnation is the following. The 
consumption parameters are different between the stagnation and the hypothetical 
economies. Consumer preferences, given by ),( βγ , transform the difference in 
consumption parameters into a difference in utility levels. The whole cost of stagnation 
is measured by the compensation required to leave consumers indifferent between the 
two economies. This compensation is uniform across all periods. The whole cost 
implies the cost from the beginning of the stagnation to the future. 
 The calculation of λ* is given by: 
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where: 
{ } { })(1ln)(1lnexpand)(1ln)(1lnexp HHSS µγβφµγβφ +−+=+−+= . 
 
 The derivation is given in the Appendix.2  
 
2.2. Properties of Welfare Costs  
 We derive the partial derivatives of the cost λ∗in terms of the time preference 
                                                 
2  Obstfeld (1994, pp. 1474–75) completely derived the cost of stagnation in the framework of 
Lucas, and the formulation of the costs is the mostly same as in (6). However, his concern was 
only with the cost of the economic instability. Obstfeld evaluated whether the persistency of 
consumption shocks affects Lucas’s finding that the cost of economic instability may be slight. 
Therefore, in his application, only the cost of the economic instability was examined, and no 
analysis of the cost of the stagnation was provided (see Section 4 of Obstfeld, 1994). 
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β  and the relative risk aversion γ  by using equation (6) under 1>γ : 
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where 11 << SH and φφ , as shown in equation (4).3 When the growth rate of 
consumption falls in a stagnation period (i.e., µH>µS, which means that SH φφ < ), the 
increase in the time preference (i.e., the agent evaluates the future more) increases the 
welfare cost, which is uniform across all periods, to compensate for the reduced growth 
to the distant future: βλ ∂∂ ∗ / >0. When the reduced growth rate of consumption in a 
stagnation period is less than that in a prestagnation period plus the difference between 
both variances (which are estimated in this paper as mostly equal), a decrease in relative 
risk aversion increases the cost: γλ ∂∂ ∗ / <0. In addition, the signs of the derivatives in 
terms of µH, µS σH, σS, λH, and λ S are obvious: ∂λ*/∂µH>0, ∂λ*/∂µS<0, ∂λ*/∂σH <0, 
∂λ*/∂σS >0, ∂λ*/∂λH >0, and ∂λ*/∂λS <0. The derivation is given in the Appendix. 
 
3. An Alternative Model: The Dynamic Welfare Cost 
Alternatively, it is natural to assume that the stagnation economy for consumption can 
                                                 
3 So far, Lucas (1987), Obstfeld (1994), and others have only roughly investigated the 
relationship between the cost and the preference parameters by calibration. Nevertheless, our 
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be expressed by the following time-varying intercept and slope:4 
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t=0,1,2,….  
 Then, we assume that an agent has myopic rational expectations, which implies 
that an agent knows only the moments of the distribution of today’s consumption 
parameters, σ2, at (λt) and bt (µt). Moreover, an agent expects (or believes) these 
moments of today will continue forever for future consumption. Thus, based on today’s 
information, an agent obtains the conditional moments for today and for future 
consumption (i.e., the stagnation economy). The indirect utility function of (4) 
conditioned on today’s information includes the subscript of time t. 
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theoretical analysis requires that stringent results be obtained. 
4 We assume the variance of shocks is constant over time, considering Lucas’s finding that the 
cost of business cycles may be slight. In addition, we assume that the preference parameters are 
constant over time, following the Lucas–Obstfeld model. 
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 At period t, an agent gets these parameters and computes indirect utility from 
period t to the future, based on the coming information at period t. Here, we compare 
this indirect utility at period t with the indirect utility for the hypothetical economy 
mentioned in the Lucas–Obstfeld model. The cost of stagnation at period t is given by 
λt*, which satisfies the following equation: 
 
 ),|,,(),| ,,( 2H,
2
S,, βγσµλβγσµλλ HtHttSttSt VV =+ ∗ , (12) 
 
where the subscripts S and H denote the stagnation and the hypothetical economies, 
respectively. The parameters for the stagnation economy are changed period by period, 
whereas the parameters for the hypothetical economy are the same and constant over 
each period, as in the Lucas–Obstfeld model. The parameter λH,t is the exception 
because it is an intercept of consumption and it changes at period t. 
 Then, an agent recomputes the ‘cost at period t’ of stagnation in each period, 
based on the updated information.  
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where: 
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Keeping the variance constant in the stagnation period but letting the consumption 
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intercept and growth fluctuate, the agent recomputes the cost at period t, comparing 
with the hypothetical economy. This cost of stagnation is different period by period.  
 Figure 2 is a schematic diagram that describes this idea and summarizes our 
alternative model. An agent knows only the present period (T1)’s intercept λS,T1 and 
slope µS,T1 in (11) from information at period T1, and he or she expects (or believes) 
these parameters λS,T1 and µS,T1 will continue forever. On this basis, the agent constructs 
the stagnation economy from period t to the future. Thus, the stagnation economies 
expected from period T1 to the future and from period T2 to the future will be different, 
and as a result, the costs between T1 and T2 are different. The ‘cost at period t’ 
calculated in this way may be referred to as the dynamic cost of stagnation, in contrast 
to the ‘whole cost’ computed from the beginning of the stagnation to the future by the 
Lucas–Obstfeld model. In general, the cost at period t will be higher at the start and 
lower at the end of the stagnation period. 
 
[INSERT Figure 2] 
 
 By using a ‘cost at period t’, we can evaluate: (i) whether the policy was 
implemented immediately in the period when the highest welfare cost arose, (ii) 
whether the cost of the implemented policies was expensive compared with the welfare 
costs of stagnation, and (iii) whether the cost of stagnation decreased gradually—that is, 
whether the policies were effective—or whether additional policies are required, which 
will be ascertained by determining the current welfare costs. These specific exercises 
cannot be undertaken under the existing frameworks, including under the 
Lucas–Obstfeld model.  
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 Although an alternative model can compute the cost period by period, how can it 
derive the whole cost of stagnation that occurred in an era? We may consider the ‘cost at 
the starting period t’ as the ‘whole cost’ of stagnation. However, as an agent has myopic 
rational expectations about the stagnation economy expressed by time-varying 
parameters, he or she cannot predict the future economy. Thus, the ‘cost at the starting 
period’ cannot correctly capture the ‘whole cost’ from the starting period to the future. 
On the other hand, it is a very bold and implausible assumption that an agent has 
rational but not myopic rational expectations of the stagnation economy expressed by 
time-varying parameters. Moreover, it is technically difficult to derive the ‘ whole cost’ 
and the ‘cost at period t’ by applying the Lucas–Obstfeld model to an economy 
expressed by constant parameters. Thus, the two cost measures are derived based on the 
two different conceptions of the stagnation economy. However, we propose a 
compromise. If we value a long-run viewpoint, it is natural to assume a stagnation 
economy with constant growth over time and instability. In contrast, if we value a 
short-run viewpoint, the assumption of a stagnation economy with time-varying 
parameters is more natural. In this sense, when we value the long-run viewpoint and 
evaluate the ‘whole cost’ of stagnation that has occurred in an era, the Lucas–Obstfeld 
measure may be appropriate.  
 
4. A Practical Illustration of the Lucas–Obstfeld Model and the Alternative Model 
4.1. Data, Unit Root, and Structural Change 
The data used in this paper are monthly data from January 1975 to August 2002 (i.e., 
1975:M1 to 2002:M8), which provides 332 observations. To estimate the parameters (λ, 
µ, and σ2) for consumption in the model, we use total consumption expenditure for 
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workers’ households from the Monthly Report on Family Income and Expenditures 
Survey (FIES). As the FIES reports nonseasonally adjusted data, we apply the census 
X-11 method to obtain the seasonally adjusted series. The per capita series is 
constructed by dividing consumption expenditure by the number of family members in 
the household. These data are converted to real values by using the consumer price 
index (for general prices in 2000) from the Monthly Report of the Consumer Price Index. 
All data are taken from the NIKKEI NEEDS CD-ROM. 
 We partition the whole sample (1975:M1 to 2002:M8) into two subsamples. The 
first subsample is from 1975:M1 to 1989:M12 and the second is from 1990:M1 to 
2002:M8. The first subsample is the prestagnation period. Our objective is to estimate 
the cost of stagnation during the second period (the stagnation period) by comparing it 
with the hypothetical economy. This partition of periods seems appropriate, and is 
consistent with previous research, including Hayashi and Prescott (2002).5 Moreover, 
we implement the tests for a unit root of consumption and for the structural change by 
using equation (14) of Perron (1989, p.1380): 
 
∑
=
−− +∆++++++=∆
k
i
titittttt CCDTbtbTBDaDUaaC
1
121321 loglog)(log εξρ ,   (14) 
 
                                                 
5 We suggest that stagnation began in 1990:M1 because the NIKKEI 225 peaked at a stock 
price of 38,926 yen in 1989:M12. Since that date, it has fallen gradually, as has the price of land. 
These events are said to define the collapse of the so-called Japanese bubble economy. In line 
with previous research, we maintain the importance of these events in defining the starting point 
of stagnation. Figure 2 plots consumption in logs, which shows the behavior of the data in the 
model. It suggests a trend break in the log of consumption (which reduces consumption growth) 
around 1990:M1. These figures suggest an obvious structural change. 
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where DUt=1 if t>TB and 0 otherwise, D(TB)t=1 if t= TB+1 and 0 otherwise, DTt=t if 
t>TB and 0 otherwise.  This model allows a sudden change in the level followed by a 
shift in the slope of the trend function at time TB (1< TB<T). TB=1989:M12. Both the 
null model of the unit root (ρ=0,b1=b2=0) and the alternative of trend stationarity (ρ<0) 
are nested in (14). At the same time, this nested model allow us to test the structural 
change at t=TB+1. In fact, the structural change did occur because a2 and b2 seem to be 
significant, but a3 is not significant and hence there is no jumping of data series. Table 1 
rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root for consumption and the null hypothesis of no 
structural change at TB+1=1990:M1.The visual inspection is given in Figure 3. 
  
[INSERT Figure 3 and Table 1] 
 
4.2. Preference Parameters  
In order to compute the welfare cost of stagnation, the preference parameters are set 
exogenously, following convention. For the coefficient of relative risk aversion, we use 
values of }0.5,5.3,5.2,5.1,5.0{∈γ . Previous studies suggest that, as long as the 
constant relative risk aversion preferences are used, the value of γ falls into this range 
(see, e.g., Kitamura and Fujiki (1997), Hamori (1998), and Nakano and Saito (1998)). 
We choose 5.2=γ as a base value and adopt a strategy that evaluates how the welfare 
cost is affected by the other choice of γ . For the discount factor, we take values of 
}998.0,997.0,996.0,995.0,994.0{∈β  and choose 996.0=β as a base value. Similarly, 
we check the robustness of the welfare cost to the other values of β .  
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4.3 Estimated Cost for a Lucas-Obstfeld Model 
Normality of Stochastic Term and Estimated Parameters 
The parameters for consumption in the prestagnation period (1975:M1–1989:M12) and 
the stagnation period (1990:M1–2002:M8) are estimated by applying an ML 
methodology to the whole sample from 1975:M1 to 2002:M8: 
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where DUt=1 if t>TB (that is, TB=1989:M12) and 0 otherwise. As shown in Table 2A, 
each test statistic for mean=0, skewness=0, excess kurtosis=0, and nonserial correlation 
of the squared error term with lags of up to 6 are not statistically significant at the 1% 
level, except for excess kurtosis in the stagnation period, supporting the normality of ln 
zt. In Panel (A) of Table 2B, the parameters in both the prestagnation and the stagnation 
periods are estimated and denoted as the estimated parameters for the hypothetical 
economy and the stagnation economy. The exception is an estimate for λ in a 
hypothetical economy, which is replaced with one for a stagnation economy for the sake 
of simplicity (the difference is negligible because a3=0 in Table 1, which means no 
jumping of the data series). Thus, an agent perceives that the estimated parameters in 
both periods are the consumption parameters for both economies. All parameter 
estimates for consumption are statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimated 
monthly consumption growth rate falls from 0.1059% in the prestagnation period to 
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–0.002018%. The variance (which represents instability) of the error term in the log of 
consumption increases from 2.339E(–4) to 3.927E(–4). The difference in consumption 
growth and variance between both economies is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
as is shown in Panel (B) of Table 2B.  
 
[INSERT Tables 2A and 2B] 
 
Estimated Cost 
What is the estimated cost of stagnation according to this model? As Table 3 shows, by 
using these parameters in equation (5), we obtain a utility level of –3.813E(–06) for the 
hypothetical economy and one of –5.362E(–06) for the stagnation economy. This 
implies that stagnation reduces utility. Our cost measure λ* enables us to convert the 
reduction in the utility level into a level of compensation in Japanese yen, which is the 
same for all periods. The cost of stagnation is 25,390 yen. The cost ratio (cost/λH) is the 
ratio of the cost to the consumption of the hypothetical economy at the starting period. It 
is 26%, which shows the relative amounts and hence an actual impact. 
 To check the robustness of the results, we calibrate the preference parameters in 
(1). We use γ = 0.5,1.5, 2.5, 3.5, and 5.0 and β = 0.994, 0.995, 0.996, 0.997, and 0.998 
around the base values in Table 4. Note here that γ>0 implies risk aversion. The ratios of 
costs range from 17% to 49% as β increases at γ =2.5, and from 20% to 33% as γ 
decreases at β =0.996, as the theoretical analysis suggests in (7) and (8). The ratios of 
costs reach a maximum at 87% and a minimum at 15%. These numbers are not small 
and the cost ratio seems to be relatively sensitive to the time preference.  
 Thus, the proposed ‘whole cost’ λ*, which is particularly relevant to consumers, 
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suggests that the cost of stagnation is large for Japanese consumers. As this represents 
what people are willing to pay to prevent the outbreak of stagnation, it indicates that 
people were prepared to pay a great deal to avoid the stagnation.  
 
[INSERT Tables 3 and 4] 
 
4.4. Estimated Cost for an Alternative Model 
Estimated Parameters 
The estimation results for α0, α1, β0, and β1 and other parameters in model (9) are 
obtained by the Kalman filter algorithm for the time varying parameter model (see the 
Appendix). The estimation results are shown in Table 5. Moreover, the estimated at and 
bt over time, the actual values of log Ct, and the estimated at+ t⋅bt values over time are 
shown in Figure 4.6 By using the estimated parameters in Table 5, the estimated 
coefficients over time are at =0.609+0.947 at-1 and b t=0+0.496 bt-1 , where some 
estimated parameters are not significant at the 5% or 10% levels. However, the 
dynamics of coefficients converge to lim t→∞a t =0.609/(1-0.947) =11.518 and lim t→∞b t 
=0. In addition, the dynamic process of those coefficients are shown in Figure 4, and 
thus the time-varying coefficient estimates without the growth component (b t =0) can 
capture the actual values of consumption, as seen in the third column of Figure 4.7 On 
date T1 in Figure 2, an agent can know the moments of distribution of the consumption 
                                                 
6 In general, the normality test of a stochastic term is difficult. This will be a task for the future. 
7 Miyakoshi, Okubo, and Shimada (2006) have analyzed the welfare cost of the 1997 Asian 
crisis for the Asian countries by using this model. The time-varying parameter estimates cannot 
capture the recovery process for each country without the growth component because the Asian 
economy has grown strongly after the crisis.  
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process on period T1, that is, aT1, bT1, and σ2 in (9). The agent expects that these 
parameters will continue forever, and computes the welfare cost on this basis. However, 
on period T1+1, the agent recomputes a different welfare cost, based on aT1+1, bT1+1, and 
σ on period T1+1. As seen in Figure 5, the estimated growth parameter µST and the 
initial level of consumption λST are less than those values for the hypothetical economy 
for nearly all periods, which results in a higher cost of stagnation. On the other hand, the 
finding that the instability σ2 (=0.013 *0.013 =0.00017 in Table 5) of the stagnation 
economy is smaller than that of the hypothetical economy σ2 (=2.339E(–4) in Table 2B) 
results in a lower cost.  
 
[INSERT Table 5, Figure 4, and Figure 5] 
 
Estimated Costs 
We can compute the welfare cost at each period by applying equation (13). As seen in 
Figure 6, the dynamic cost ratio (i.e., cost at each period/ λH, where λH =99,373 yen is 
for 1990:M1 in (9)) shows the four peaks, which are 42% (44,260 yen per month) in 
February 1995, 42% (45,268 yen) in May 1997, 47% (51,992 yen) in February 1999, 
and 51% (59,399 yen) in December 2001. In addition, the cost remains high at 48% in 
the last period of August 2002. The cost of stagnation is large (more than 30% or 29,812 
yen per month) for all periods and shows no sign of decreasing.8  
 
[INSERT Figure 6] 
                                                 
8 However, Miyakoshi, Okubo and Shimada (2006) have found that the welfare cost of the 1997 
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Characteristics of the Alternative Model 
We evaluate whether the policy was implemented immediately around February 1995, 
when the first peak of welfare cost arose. Table 6 shows the rapid policy response soon 
after, which involved establishing a special bank to rescue failed banks. At the same 
time, the Ministry of Finance announced a decrease in the budget by 2.9%. Although 
these two policies seem to conflict, they were implemented immediately, and the 
recovery process seemed to proceed slowly until the second peak in May 1997. 
However, the policy did not prevent the subsequent accidental failures of two big 
financial companies (Hokkaido Takushyoku Bank and Yamaichi Security Company) in 
November 1997. The ineffectiveness of this policy induced the third peak in February 
1999. The timing of policy implementation in February and March 1999 was rapid for 
the third peak, but ineffective, which induced the fourth peak of 51% in December 2001. 
Rather than the timing of policy implementation being the problem, the policies 
themselves were not effective.  
 We evaluate whether the cost of the policies implemented was cheap in 
comparison with the size of the welfare costs. That is, if the public money injection (the 
policy costs) of 7 trillion yen on March 19, 1999 could rescue the economy immediately, 
would people agree to pay this policy cost? The welfare costs (51,992 yen in February 
1999) implies that people pay 51,992 yen per month forever (many months). On the 
other hand, if 7 trillion yen in policy costs can sustain the hypothetical economy, how 
many months should people pay the cost of 51,992 yen per month to collect 7 trillion 
                                                                                                                                               
Asian crisis decreased gradually despite repeated upturns and downturns of costs. 
 20
yen? That is, (policy costs/number of workers in February 1999)/the welfare cost equals 
the number of months. Then, (7 trillion yen/53,250,000 workers)/51,992 yen/month = 
2.5 months.9 Less than three months is a very short period, meaning people will agree 
to pay the cheaper policy cost than the welfare cost. If the effectiveness of the policy is 
confirmed, the government can publicly announce the cheap cost of the policy. However, 
actually it is not confirmed.  
 We evaluate whether the cost decreased gradually, that is, whether the policies 
were effective, or whether additional policies are now required by checking the current 
welfare costs. The cost of stagnation at period t increased rapidly to 30% in June 1990, 
and did not show any sign of decreasing, suggesting that the policies were ineffective. 
Finally, the welfare cost remained high at 48% in the last period of August 2002. This 
suggests that an additional policy is required.     
 
[INSERT Table 7] 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has proposed an alternative measure to the Lucas–Obstfeld model to analyze 
the welfare cost of stagnation. In addition, it has provided a practical illustration of the 
alternative model in comparison with the Lucas–Obstfeld model, by using Japanese data 
from 1975 to 2002. The cost of the stagnation is worth measuring, but the practical use 
of measuring this cost had not been explored previously. 
 Using the Lucas–Obstfeld model, which is based on a long-run viewpoint and 
                                                 
9 The data for 53,250,000 workers (employees) were compiled from the Labor Force Survey of 
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assumes a stagnation process with constant growth over time and instability, we found 
that the ratio of the ‘whole cost’ is high at 26% of the consumption at the starting period 
of stagnation (99,373 yen). We proposed an alternative model, which is based on a 
short-run viewpoint and assumes a stagnation process with time-varying consumption. 
Based on this model, the cost of the policies implemented immediately after the 
stagnation cost hit the third peak was 7 trillion yen in March 1999, which is not 
expensive compared with the corresponding welfare cost in February 1999. However, in 
the absence of effective policies, the cost did not decrease, but remained at 55,610 yen 
(48%) in August 2002, suggesting that an additional policy is required. Thus, two cost 
measures, the ‘whole cost’ and the ‘cost at period t’ of stagnation, proposed by both 
models, seem to be complementary in evaluating the cost of stagnation. 
                                                                                                                                               
the Statistic Bureau of Japan. 
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Appendix 
Derivation of equation (4) 
Taking the logarithm of consumption in (2) and defining the first three terms as αt, we 
obtain the following: 
 
2
2
1-)(1lntln,lnln σµλαα +⋅+=+= tttt zC
. (A-1) 
Clearly, E(lnCt) = αt and Var(lnCt) = σ2. In addition, because of the property of 
log-normality, E(Ct) = exp{αt +σ2 /2}. In the utility function (1), we take logarithms and 
obtain the following: 
 .)(1,][ln][ln
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Using the above property of log-normality, we can rewrite the above equation as: 
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Extensive rearrangement yields the following: 
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Hence, 
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Thus, inserting these relations into (1) yields the following indirect utility function: 
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Derivation of equation (6) 
Substituting (4) into (5) yields: 
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Taking logarithms of (A-7) yields: 
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S
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We replace the right-hand side of (A-8) with Ψ to obtain equation (6). 
 
 
Derivation of equations (7) and (8) 
The Ψ in equation (6) is rewritten as follows: 
{ } )(
2
ln)(1)-1ln()-1ln(
1
1 22
HSHHS σσγλγφφγ −+−+−−=Ψ . (A-9) 
We take derivatives of equation (6). First, βφβφβφβφ //,// SSHH =∂∂=∂∂ . Second, 
using these relations, we obtain: 
  )-1)(-1()(1
)-(
HS
SH
φφβγ
φφ
β −=∂
Ψ∂
. (A-10) 
Finally, inserting this relation into ββλ ∂Ψ∂⋅Ψ=∂∂ ∗ /)exp(/ , we obtain equation (7). 
 The φH and φS in (6) are approximated by a Taylor expansion around 1=β  and 
µ=0. They then become:  
 HH µγβφ )(1−+=   ,  SS µγβφ )(1−+= . (A-11) 
Then, we obtain the relation: ))(1()1()1( HSHSSH µµβµφµφ −−=−−− . We obtain the 
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following partial derivatives: SSHH µγφµγφ −=∂∂−=∂∂ /,/ . Finally, we take the 
derivative of λ*. That is, γγ
λ
∂
Ψ∂⋅Ψ=∂
∂ ∗ }exp{ . Here:  
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When we evaluate this derivative at 1=β (its common parameter between both 
paradigms), its derivative leads to equation (8).  
 However, the signs of derivatives in terms of the µH, µS σH, σS, λH, and λ S are 
directly derived without approximation around 1=β and µ=0.  ■ 
 
The Kalman filter algorithm for the time-varying parameter model 
  We briefly describe the Kalman filter algorithm for the time-varying parameter in 
our model’s equations (9) and (10). We derive the smoothing estimates of the 
time-varying parameter. 
    The time-varying parameter model for (9) and (10) can be regarded as the state 
space model.  
The observation equation:  
 )(0,~:xHy 2t σεε N tttt += , ? ? (A-13) 
 
where yt ≡ ln Ct, εt ≡ ln zt, at ≡ ln λt-σ2/2, bt ≡ ln(1+µt), Ht = (1, t), and xt = (at, bt)'. 
 
The state equation:  
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    We set the initial conditions a1 and b1 to be the estimates of regression model:  
 )σ(0,~ln :ln ln 2NzztbaC ttt +⋅+= ,           (A-15) 
obtained from the first four samples. 
    The unknown parameters are θ = (α0, α1, qa, β0, β1, qb, σ, a0, and b0).  Applying a 
standard Kalman filter algorithm, we can obtain the estimates of parameters and state 
variables. See Hamilton (1994) and Harvey (1989) for a detailed explanation of the 
Kalman filter algorithm.  
    The smoothing densities of at and bt given the full sample YT = (yT, ..., y1) are:  
 
),(~ |
a
t|TTtTt PaNYa ,   ),(~ |
b
t|TTtTt PbNYb ,                      (A-16) 
where [ ]TtTt YaEa ≡ , [ ]TtTt YbEb ≡ , [ ]TtTt YaVarP ≡a , and [ ]TtTt YbVarP ≡b . 
So, the smoothing estimates of λt and µt are obtained by the expectations of log-normal 
density:  
    ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ++= at|TtTt Pa 2
1ˆ
2
1expYE 2σλ ,                   (A-17) 
    ( ) 121expYE −⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ += bt|TtTt Pbµ .                   (A-18) 
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Table 1. Perron’s t test for Unit Root Hypothesis and Structural Change in the Trend 
Break at 1989:M12 
a1      a2       a3       b1            b2           ρ          ξ1       ξ2   
4.124   0.090    0.001   3.920E(–4)  –4.102E(–4)   –0.366      –0.348    –0.155 
(5.85)  (5.33)    (0.08)   (5.64)      (–5.43)       (–5.84)     (–5.30)     (–2.81) 
Note: E(–x) denotes 10–x. The numbers in parentheses denote t statistics. The order of the six lags is 
determined by SBIC and AIC, and the second lag is chosen unanimously by both criteria. The 1% 
significance point of the t statistic for ρ=0 is –4.90 from Table VI.B of Perron (1989, p. 1377), in 
view of the fact that 180/332≈0.5. 
 
Table 2A. Normality of the Stochastic Term 
Period NOBS MEAN STDEV SKEW  EXKURT Q2(6)   
PS-Period 180 –0.000 0.015 0.230 0.800 2.898 
S-Period 152 0.000 0.020 0.471 1.653* 6.006 
Note: PS-Period and S-Period denote the prestagnation period and the stagnation period, respectively. 
NOBS, MEAN, STDEV, SKEW, and EXKURT denote the number of observations, the mean, 
standard deviation, skewness, and excess kurtosis, respectively. The symbol ** denotes statistically 
significance at the 1% level for each test statistics for mean=0, skewness=0, and excess kurtosis=0. 
The Ljung-Box Q-Statistics, Q2(6), are distributed as χ2 (6) under the null hypothesis of nonserial 
correlation with up to six lags. The 1% critical value is 16.8.  
 
Table 2B. Estimated Parameters for Consumption 
(A) Consumption Parameters (B) Test Hypotheses  
    H-ECO     S-ECO 
λ   99373 yen   99373 yen 
     (619.43)   (619.43) 
µ  1.059E(–3)   –2.018E(–5) 
    (101.91)     (–3.33) 
σ2  2.339E(–4)   3.927E(–4)  
(10.95)      (11.50) 
Hypothesis   χ2(1) 
 
 
H1: µH=µS,    8049.48 
 
H2: σ2H=σ2S,    15.54 
 
Note: H-ECO and S-ECO denote the hypothetical economy and the stagnation economy, 
respectively. The λ is consumption in yen in 1990:M1 for both economies. All coefficients were 
significant at the 1% level. The critical value of the χ2(1) distribution is 6.64 at the 1% level. 
Table 3. Welfare Costs (γ*=2.5, β*=0.996) 
Parameters          Indirect Utility              Cost  
                    H-ECO     S-ECO           Level (yen)   Ratio=λ*/λH(%) 
γ=γ*,β=β*        –3.813E(–06)  –5.362E(–06)       25,390        26 
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Table 4. Welfare Costs (ratio) based on Various Preference Parameters (%) 
β  
     0.994     0.995      0.996      0.997      0.998 
 
 
γ 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
5.0 
     21       25        33        48         87 
     19       23        29        39         61  
     17       21        26        34         49 
     16       19        23        30         42 
     15       17        20        25         34 
Note: The welfare cost (ratio) is λ*/λH (%). 
 
Table 5. Estimated Parameters in (10)    
?  σ α0 α1 q a β0 β1 q b 
Estimates 0.013 0.609 0.947 0.003 0.000 0.496 0.000 
t values (9.04) (0.91) (16.19) (3.16) (-0.40) (1.15) (2.71) 
 
Table 6. Main Economic Policies around the Peaks of Welfare Costs 
Date Events and the Contents of Policy 
12/1/1994 
12/9/1994 
12/20/1994 
The credit unions began to fail. 
The government decided to establish a special bank to rescue failed banks. 
The Ministry of Finance announced a decrease in the budget by 2.9% after a 40 
year period without any reductions in the budget. 
5/1/1997 
5/30/1997 
6/27/1997 
Security companies began to fail. 
The Acts related to stock options and mortgage securitization were issued.  
The Fidelity and the Hyunde security companies (foreign companies) obtained 
security dealers’ licenses from the Ministry of Finance.  
2/1/1999 
2/26/1999 
3/12/1999 
 
The big banks began to fail. 
The think tank of the prime minister announced the rescue packages. 
The government injected public money of 7 trillion yen to rescue the big banks. 
12/1/2001 
12/18/2001 
 
2/28/2002 
Many private companies began to fail. 
Of the companies having special status (Tokushu-hojin, in Japanese), only 17 were 
abolished and 45 privatized. 
The Bank of Japan increased the amount of its open market operations 
(purchasing), from 0.8 trillion yen per month to 1 trillion yen per month. 
Note: We checked policies implemented within two months of the peaks in costs. The date of the 
cost peaks and the main events following within two months are denoted in bold.  
Sources: Nikkei Kinyu Nenpo 2005 (Summer), and Nippon Kezai Senbun Shya (in Japanese). 
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Figure 1. Hypothetical and Stagnation Economies using the Lucas–Obstfeld Model  
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Note: PSP (H-ECO) and SP (S-ECO) denote the prestagnation period (the hypothetical economy) 
and the stagnation period (the stagnation economy), respectively. Parts of the intercept, –(1/2)σ2H 
and –1/2)σ2S, are neglected because they are negligible. 
 
 
Figure 2. Hypothetical and Stagnation Economies using the Alternative Model  
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Note: See the note for Figure 1. 
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Figure 3. Per Capita Total Consumption in Logarithm (Aggregate) 
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Figure 4. Estimated at and bt over Time: Estimation Values vs Actual Values 
??
?????
?????
?????
?????
????? ????? ????? ?????
 
??
???????
??????
??????
??????
????? ????? ????? ?????
 
???????????????
?????
?????
?????
?????
?????
????? ????? ????? ?????
???????
????
 
 32
Figure 5. Estimated µt and ln(λt) over time: Hypothetical vs Stagnation 
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Note: The dotted and solid lines are for the hypothetical and stagnation economies, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 6. The Ratio of Cost at Each Period 
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